DFIR-IRIS Hands-on Labs¶
Use the Interactive Lab to assemble a timeline from synthetic evidence, or the Full Lab to document a complete investigation in your own isolated DFIR-IRIS deployment.
Beginner terminology used in these labs
- DFIR
- Digital forensics and incident response: investigating security events while preserving evidence and coordinating response.
- VM
- Virtual machine: an isolated software-based computer used to run the lab safely.
- TLS
- Transport Layer Security: encryption used to protect network connections.
- IOC
- Indicator of compromise: an observable such as an IP address that may be relevant to an investigation; it is not proof of compromise by itself.
- P2
- Priority 2: an important case that needs prompt investigation but is below the most urgent priority.
- SHA-256
- Secure Hash Algorithm 256-bit: a value used to identify and integrity-check an evidence file.
Also useful: an asset is a system or account involved in the case, while provenance records where evidence came from and how it was collected.
Hands-on proof of concept
Preserve it. Sequence it. Explain it.
Build a defensible incident timeline, connect evidence to affected assets, and report what the records support without overstating them.
DFIR-IRIS Full Lab
Already have a working DFIR-IRIS lab?
Confirm the instance is isolated, create a recovery snapshot, download the synthetic evidence pack below, and begin with Activity 2.
Do not generate a real attack
This exercise uses synthetic records. You can complete it without executing malware, brute-force tools, or other attack simulation.
Objective¶
Build an isolated DFIR-IRIS environment, create an investigation from a supplied fictional event set, construct a reliable timeline, preserve evidence metadata, and generate a reviewable report.
Synthetic evidence pack¶
Download these safe text fixtures. They contain no malware and use reserved example addresses:
Keep the files unchanged and verify them before creating the case:
All three files must return OK. If your platform changes line endings during download, download the files again rather than updating the supplied hashes.
01
Activity 1: Prepare the environment¶
- Create an isolated Ubuntu VM and follow the DFIR-IRIS installation journey.
- Record image and package sources, versions, checksums, VM settings, network mode, and container health.
- Secure administrator access and create a named analyst account with only the required permissions.
- Create a fictional customer named
Northwind Laband a clean recovery snapshot. - Verify the synthetic evidence pack against
SHA256SUMSand record the analyst who performed the check.
Expected result DFIR-IRIS is healthy, isolated, access-controlled, and ready for a synthetic case.
02
Activity 2: Build the investigation¶
Create the case with these values:
The fields follow the workflow described in the official case operations guide.
| Field | Value |
|---|---|
| Customer | Northwind Lab |
| Case name | Unexpected archive and outbound connection |
| Classification | Information-Content-Security: Unauthorised access to information |
| Short description | Archive creation followed by an outbound TLS connection |
| SOC ticket ID | SOC-2026-042 |
Use these records from the supplied fixtures:
| Time | Source | Event |
|---|---|---|
| 10:02 | Identity | User mira signs in to ENG-WS04 |
| 10:08 | Endpoint | powershell.exe creates C:\Temp\project.zip |
| 10:11 | Network | ENG-WS04 connects to 203.0.113.77:443 |
| 10:14 | Endpoint | Archive is deleted |
- Add
ENG-WS04as a computer asset and recordmiraas the associated identity in the description or case notes. - Add
203.0.113.77to the IOC tab as an IP address with the tagtraining. Record that it is a reserved synthetic address and has not been proven malicious. - Upload the three fixture files to the case datastore and mark each as evidence. Record its filename, source, collector, collection time, original location, and supplied SHA-256 hash.
- Add all four events to the timeline in chronological order and link them to
ENG-WS04where appropriate. - Record two hypotheses: authorised archive handling and suspicious staging for possible transfer. State what additional endpoint or network evidence would distinguish them.
- Create and assign tasks for identity validation, endpoint preservation, destination review, and business-context confirmation.
Expected result The timeline separates facts from hypotheses and every important claim points to a preserved evidence record.
03
Activity 3: Report and validate¶
- Complete the tasks with these internally consistent training findings:
- identity:
mira could not confirm the activity; - endpoint:
archive creation and deletion are recorded, but archive contents and process intent are unavailable; - network:
an outbound TLS connection is recorded, but transferred content and volume are unavailable; - business context:
no approved archive-transfer activity was found for the time window.
- identity:
- Record which systems and identities are in scope and which remain unconfirmed.
- Use a bounded conclusion:
The observed sequence warrants escalation and further endpoint collection. The available records do not prove the archive contents or successful exfiltration. - Generate a DFIR-IRIS report and review it as if you were a second analyst.
- Confirm the timeline, evidence references, owners, and limitations are understandable without oral context.
- Back up the database using the case-management walkthrough, verify the archive and checksum, and record how a restore would be tested in a disposable recovery instance.
Expected result A second analyst can reproduce the sequence, trace every conclusion to evidence, and understand the investigation's limitations.
Clean up¶
Export the sanitised report and evidence notes you intend to keep. Remove the synthetic case and temporary accounts if the instance will be reused, or revert the disposable VM to its clean snapshot. Do not retain generated administrator credentials in screenshots or lab submissions.